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Was the high inﬂation of the 1970s mostly due to incomplete information about
the structure of the economy (an unavoidable mistake as suggested by Orphanides,
2000)? Or, to weak reaction to expected inﬂation and/or excessive policy activism
that led to indeterminacies (a policy mistake, a scenario suggested by Clarida, Gali
and Gertler, 2000)? We study this question within the NNS model with policy
commitment and imperfect information, requiring that the model have satisfactory
overall empirical performance. We ﬁnd that both explanations do a good job in
accounting for the great inﬂation. Even with the commonly used speciﬁcation of the
interest policy rule, high and persistent inﬂation can occur following a signiﬁcant
productivity slowdown if policymakers signiﬁcantly and persistently underestimate
”core” inﬂation.
JEL class: E32 E52
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April 2004Executive summary
During the 1970s, the inﬂation rate in the US reached its 20-th century peak, with levels
exceeding 10%. The causes of this ”great” inﬂation remain the subject of considerable
academic debate. Broadly speaking, the proposed explanations fall into two categories.
Those that claim that the high inﬂation was due to the lack of proper incentives on
the part of policymakers who chose to accept (or even induce) high inﬂation in order to
prevent a recession (an inﬂation bias; Barro and Gordon, 1982, Ireland, 1999). And those
that claim that it may have been the result of the honest mistakes of a well-meaning
central bank. The latter category can be further subdivided into a group of explanations
that emphasizes bad lack under imperfect information and another one that emphasizes
a technical, inadvertent error in policy.
According to the latter view, the FED inadvertently committed a ”technical” error by
implementing an interest policy rule in which nominal interest rates were moved less
than expected inﬂation (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 2000). The resulting decrease in real
interest rates fuelled inﬂation inducing instability (indeterminacy) in the economy and
exaggerating inﬂation movements. The implication of this view is that adoption of the
standard Henderson–McKibbin–Taylor (HMT)rule would have prevented the persistent
surge in inﬂation.
The bad luck view claims that loose monetary policy and inﬂation reﬂected an unavoid-
able mistake on the part of a monetary authority whose tolerance of inﬂation did not
diﬀer signiﬁcantly from that commonly attributed to the authorities in the 80s and 90s.
Orphanides (2001) has argued that the large decrease in actual output following the per-
sistent downward shift in potential output was interpreted as a decrease in the output
gap. It led to expansionary monetary policy that exaggerated the inﬂationary impact
of the decrease in potential output. Eventually and after a long delay, the FED realized
that potential output growth was lower and adjusted policy to bring inﬂation down. Im-
perfect information about the substantial productivity slowdown rather than tolerance
of inﬂation played the critical role in the inﬂation process.
Several attempts have been made in the literature to evaluate the validity of the various
explanations belonging to the second category. Such tests typically examine whether the
model can generate a persistence increase in inﬂation, which has not proved too diﬃcult
to accomplish. Nevertheless, there have not been any attempts to assess the relative
performance of the bad luck vs bad policy theories. The objective of this paper is to do
just this using a broader set of ﬁtness criteria.
We employ the standard New Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS) model with the addition of
5
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tency by assuming that the policymakers commit to following a standard HMT policy
rule. We ask whether and under what conditions the model can replicate the evolution of
inﬂation following a severe, persistent slowdown in the rate of productivity growth and
also satisfy additional ﬁtness criteria. In principle, focusing on a single variable oﬀers
too little discipline.
We ﬁrst examine whether the model can account for the empirical evidence when the
policy rule is similar to that commonly attributed to the ”Volcker–Greenspan” FED (the
bad luck scenario). We ﬁnd that this is indeed the case. The model can generate a large,
persistent increase in inﬂation following a very large productivity slowdown if there exists
a very high degree of imperfect information. Imperfect information introduces stickiness
in inﬂation forecasts and makes the estimated inﬂation ”gap” small. The underestimation
of the inﬂation gap leads to weak policy reaction even when the policy reaction coeﬃcient
on inﬂation is small. In addition to generating good inﬂation performance, this version
of the model can also generate suﬃcient volatility in key macroeconomic variables. The
main weaknesses of the model can be found in its implication of a implausibly severe
recession and requirement of a very large shock.
We then examine the performance of the model under HMT rules that allow for inde-
terminacy (following Clarida, Gali and Gertler, CGG hereafter) due to a weak policy
reaction coeﬃcient to inﬂation. Some of these rules have good properties: They generate
inﬂation persistence and realistic overall macroeconomic volatility. Their main weakness,
though, is that they also generate too severe of a recession.
The conclusion we draw from this analysis is that the data clearly support the view that
the FED did not react to inﬂation developments in the 70s strongly enough, that is, it did
not raise interest rates suﬃciently. Thus policy contributed to higher inﬂation. But the
source of the weak reaction is hard to identify. High and persistent inﬂation can occur
following a productivity slowdown either because the inﬂation reaction coeﬃcient is low
(the Clarida-Gali-Gertler scenario of bad policy ) or because the estimated inﬂation gap
to which policy is reacting is low (the Orphanides scenario of imperfect information).
The analysis in this paper suggests that both scenarios are comparably successful in
matching the data and additional tests may be needed in order to settle the debate.
We argue, though, that there exist reasons that make it very diﬃcult to discriminate
between these two theories.
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The causes of the “great” inﬂation of the 1970s remain the subject of debate. While
there is widespread agreement that “loose” monetary policy played a major rule, there is
less agreement concerning the factors responsible for such policy. Some have argued that
looseness was a reﬂection of policy opportunism under discretion (Barro and Gordon,
1983, Ireland, 1999). Others that it was the result of — mostly unavoidable — policy
mistakes that arose from the combination of bad luck and substantial erroneous infor-
mation about the structure of the economy and the shocks (Orphanides, 1999, 2001).
And, others that it was the result of conducting policy erroneously, namely, using a
Henderson-McKibbin-Taylor –henceforth, HMT– interest policy rule that had too small
of a reaction to expected inﬂation (see Clarida, Gertler and Gali, 2000).
The proponents of the ﬁrst view follow Barro and Gordon, 1983, in claiming that inﬂa-
tion was the product of a policy inﬂation bias. In the absence of commitment, monetary
authorities systematically attempt to generate inﬂation surprises as a means of exploiting
the expectational Phillips curve and lowering unemployment. Rational agents, though,
recognize this incentive and adjust their inﬂation expectations accordingly. In equilib-
rium, unemployment does not fall while inﬂation becomes ineﬃciently high. Ireland,
1999, has argued that the theory is consistent with the behavior of inﬂation and unem-
ployment in the US during the last four decades.
The proponents of the “honest mistake” view recognize too that the pursued monetary
policies proved to be much more inﬂationary than the FED might have anticipated.
They attribute this discrepancy to a variety of factors relating to erroneous information
about the structure of the economy. One suggestion is that the FED was the ”victim” of
conventional macroeconomic wisdom of the time that claimed the existence of a stable,
permanent tradeoﬀ between inﬂation and unemployment (De Long, 1997). Another
is that the FED was the ”victim” of econometrics. Sargent, 1999, for instance, has
argued that the data periodically give the impression of the existence of a Phillips curve
with a favorable trade–oﬀ between inﬂation and unemployment. High inﬂation then
results as the central bank attempts to exploit this. A third suggestion is that the
loose monetary policy and high inﬂation arose from neither inﬂation complacency nor a
misunderstanding of the long term Phillips curve but rather from mis–perceptions about
potential output (Orphanides, 1999, 2001). And ﬁnally, a forth suggestion is that the
FED inadvertently committed a ”technical” error. Its mistake was to implement a version
of an interest policy rule with nominal interest rates moving less than expected expected
inﬂation (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 2000). This induced instability (indeterminacy) in
7
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Al these theories seem plausible. Identifying the most empirically relevant one has not
been an easy task. A subset of the literature has tackled the issue of the contribution
of policy to inﬂation directly by estimating the monetary policy rule. Relying on sin-
gle equation estimation, Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 2000, claim that the interest rule
followed during the 1970s contained a reaction to inﬂation that led to indeterminacies.
Orphanides, 2000, disputes this claim. Using real time data, he ﬁnds no signiﬁcant dif-
ference between pre and post Volcker inﬂation tolerance. Lubic and Schforheide, 2003,
estimate a small new Keynesian model (without learning, though, on the part of mon-
etary authorities) and arrive at results similar to those of Clarida, Gertler and Gali’s.
According to their estimated model, U.S. monetary policy post 1982 is consistent with
determinacy, whereas the pre-Volcker policy is not. Nelson and Nicolov, 2002, estimate
a similar small scale model for the UK and ﬁnd that both output gap mis-measurement
and a weak policy response to inﬂation played an important role. And that the weak
reaction to inﬂation does not seem to have encouraged multiple equilibria.
A second subset of the literature uses an approach similar to Nelson and Nicolov’s but
imposes —rather than estimates— a particular speciﬁcation of the HMT rule. Lansing,
2001, ﬁnds that a speciﬁcation with suﬃciently large reaction to inﬂation is consistent
with the patterns of inﬂation and output observed during the 1970s.
Finally, a third subset of the empirical literature has investigated the events of the 70s
within the context of calibrated, stochastic general equilibrium models. Christiano and
Gust, 1999, argue that the new Keynesian model cannot replicate that experience, while
a limited participation model with indeterminacy can (they do not address the role of
imperfect information, though). Cukierman and Lippi, 2002, demonstrate how, within
a backward looking version of the new Keynesian model, imperfect information leads to
serially correlated forecast errors and loose monetary policy. Bullard and Eusepi, 2003,
argue that a persistent increase in inﬂation can obtain in the new Keynesian model even
when policy responds strongly to inﬂation when the policymakers learn gradually about
changes in trend productivity. Finally, in similar work that looks at the disinﬂation of
the 80s instead, Erceg and Levin, 2003, argue that the disinﬂation experience can be
accounted for by a shift in the inﬂation target of the FED with the public only gradually
learning about the policy regime switch.
In this paper, as in Bullard and Eusepi, we employ the standard New Neoclassical Syn-
thesis (NNS) model with the addition of imperfect information about potential output.1
1Our main diﬀerences from Bullard and Eusepi are to be found in the assumptions about the nature
8
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to following a standard HMT policy rule.
We ask whether and under what conditions the NNS model with policy commitment
can replicate the evolution of inﬂation following a severe, persistent slowdown in the
rate of productivity growth. And if yes, whether the model also meets additional ﬁtness
criteria. The importance of evaluating the ability of the model to account for the 1970s
on the basis of a larger set of variables and not just inﬂation cannot be underestimated.
In principle, focusing on a single variable oﬀers too little discipline.
We ﬁrst examine whether the model can generate a ”great inﬂation” under the assump-
tion that the HMT policy rule pursued at the time did not diﬀer from that commonly
attributed to the “Volcker–Greenspan” FED (see Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 2000, Or-
phanides, 2001). We ﬁnd that this is the case if the productivity slowdown is very large
and there exists a high degree of imperfect information2. Imperfect information intro-
duces stickiness in inﬂation forecasts, making the expected inﬂation ”gap”(the deviation
of expected from target inﬂation) small. The underestimation of the inﬂation gap leads
to weak policy reaction even when the inﬂation reaction coeﬃcient is large. We also ﬁnd
that the overall macroeconomic performance of this model is good with two exceptions:
The predicted recession is too severe. And the required shock is very large.
We then examine the performance of the model under HMT rules that allow for inde-
terminacy (following Clarida, Gali and Gertler, CGG hereafter) due to a weak policy
reaction coeﬃcient to inﬂation. Some of these rules have good properties: They generate
inﬂation persistence and realistic overall macroeconomic volatility. Their main weakness,
though, is that they also generate too severe of a recession.
Our conclusion from these exercises is that the data clearly support the view that the
FED did not react to inﬂation developments in the 70s strongly enough, in the sense
that it did not raise nominal interest rates suﬃciently. Thus policy contributed to higher
inﬂation. The source of the weak reaction, though, is harder to identify. The reaction of
the nominal interest rates to inﬂation is the product3 of the inﬂation reaction coeﬃcient
and the estimated inﬂation ”gap”. High and persistent inﬂation can occur following a
productivity slowdown either because the reaction coeﬃcient is low (the Clarida-Gali-
Gertler scenario of bad policy ) or because the estimated inﬂation gap to which policy
is reacting is low (the Orphanides scenario of imperfect information). The analysis in
of the change in productivity, the learning mechanism and the interest policy rule employed.
2We follow Svensson and Woodford, 2003, in modeling imperfect information using the Kalman ﬁlter.
3The interest policy rule includes Rt = kπ ∗ (Etπt+1 − π) + ... where Rt is the nominal interest rate,
kπ is the reaction coeﬃcient, Etπt+1 is expected inﬂation and π is the inﬂation target.
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Interestingly, our analysis also suggests that output stabilization motives may not have
played as important a role in the great inﬂation as commonly assumed.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the model. Section
2 discusses the calibration. Section 3 presents the main results. An appendix describes
the mechanics of the solution to the model under imperfect information and learning
based on the Kalman ﬁlter.
1 The model
The set up is the standard NNS model. The economy is populated by a large number of
identical inﬁnitely–lived households and consists of two sectors: one producing interme-
diate goods and the other a ﬁnal good. The intermediate good is produced with capital
and labor and the ﬁnal good with intermediate goods. The ﬁnal good is homogeneous
and can be used for consumption (private and public) and investment purposes.
1.1 The household











where 0 < β < 1 is a constant discount factor, C denotes the domestic consumption
bundle, M/P is real balances and ` is the quantity of leisure enjoyed by the representative





: R+ × R+ × [0,1] −→ R is increasing and
concave in its arguments.
The household is subject to the following time constraint
`t + ht = 1 (2)
where h denotes hours worked. The total time endowment is normalized to unity.
In each and every period, the representative household faces a budget constraint of the
form
Bt+1 + Mt + Pt(Ct + It + Tt) ≤ Rt−1Bt + Mt−1 + Nt + Πt + PtWtht + PtztKt (3)
4Et(.) denotes mathematical conditional expectations. Expectations are conditional on information
available at the beginning of period t.
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I is investment expenditure; Kt is the amount of physical capital owned by the household
and leased to the ﬁrms at the real rental rate zt. Mt−1) is the amount of money that the
household brings into period t, and Mt is the end of period t money holdings. Nt is a
nominal lump–sum transfer received from the monetary authority; Tt is the lump–sum
taxes paid to the government and used to ﬁnance government consumption.
Capital accumulates according to the law of motion








Kt + (1 − δ)Kt (4)
where δ ∈ [0,1] denotes the rate of depreciation. The second term captures the existence
of capital adjustment costs. ϕ > 0 is the capital adjustment costs parameter.
The household determines her consumption/savings, money holdings and leisure plans
by maximizing her utility (1) subject to the time constraint (2), the budget constraint
(3) and taking the evolution of physical capital (4) into account.
1.2 Final goods sector
The ﬁnal good is produced by combining intermediate goods. This process is described








where θ ∈ (−∞,1). θ determines the elasticity of substitution between the various inputs.
The producers in this sector are assumed to behave competitively and to determine their







subject to (5), where Pt(i) denotes the price of intermediate good i. This yields demand







Yt for i ∈ (0,1) (7)
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Each ﬁrm i, i ∈ (0,1), produces an intermediate good by means of capital and labor
according to a constant returns–to–scale technology, represented by the Cobb–Douglas
production function
Xt(i) = AtKt(i)αht(i)1−α with α ∈ (0,1) (9)
where Kt(i) and ht(i) respectively denote the physical capital and the labor input used
by ﬁrm i in the production process. At is an exogenous stationary stochastic technology
shock, whose properties will be deﬁned later. Assuming that each ﬁrm i operates under
perfect competition in the input markets, the ﬁrm determines its production plan so as




subject to (9). This leads to the following expression for total costs:
PtStXt(i)




χAt with χ = αα(1 − α)1−α
Intermediate goods producers are monopolistically competitive, and therefore set prices
for the good they produce. We follow Calvo, 1983, in assuming that ﬁrms set their
prices for a stochastic number of periods. In each and every period, a ﬁrm either gets
the chance to adjust its price (an event occurring with probability γ) or it does not. In
order to maintain long term money neutrality (in the absence of monetary frictions) we
also assume that the price set by the ﬁrm grows at the steady state rate of inﬂation.
Hence, if a ﬁrm i does not reset its price, the latter is given by Pt(i) = πPt−1(i). A ﬁrm
i sets its price, e pt(i), in period t in order to maximize its discounted proﬁt ﬂow:
max
e pt(i)





γe Πt+τ(i) + (1 − γ)Πt+τ(i)
￿








and where e Πt+τ(i) = (e pt+τ(i)−Pt+τSt+τ)X(i,st+τ) is the proﬁt attained when the price
is reset, while Πt+τ(i) = (πτe pt(i)−Pt+τSt+τ)Xt+τ(i) is the proﬁt attained when the price
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Since the price setting scheme is independent of any ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristic, all ﬁrms
that reset their prices will choose the same price.
In each period, a fraction γ of contracts ends, so there are γ(1 − γ) contracts surviving
from period t − 1, and therefore γ(1 − γ)j from period t − j. Hence, from (8), the














1.4 The monetary authorities
We assume that monetary policy is conducted according to a standard HMT rule.
Namely,
b Rt = ρb Rt−1 + (1 − ρ)[kπEt(b πt+1 − π) + ky(b yt − y?
t)]
where b πt and b yt are actual output and expected inﬂation respectively and π and y?
t are
the inﬂation and output targets respectively. The output target is set equal to potential
output and the inﬂation target to the steady state rate of inﬂation. Potential output is
not observable and the monetary authorities must learn about changes in it gradually.
The learning process is described in the appendix5.
There exists disagreement in the literature regarding the empirically relevant values of kπ
and ky for the 1970s. Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 2000, claim that the pre–Volcker, HMT
monetary rule involved a policy response to inﬂation that was too weak. Namely, that
kπ < 1 which led to real indeterminacies and excessive inﬂation. The estimate the triplet
{ρ,kπ,ky} = {0.75,0.8,0.4}. Orphanides, 2001, disputes this claim. He argues that the
reaction to — expected — inﬂation was broadly similar in the pre and post–Volcker
period, but the reaction to output was stronger in the earlier period. In particular, using
real time date, he estimates {ρ,kπ,ky} = {0.75,1.6,0.6}
5See Ehrmann and Smets, 2003, for a discussion of optimal monetary policy in a related model.
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some light on the role of policy preferences relative to that of the degree of imperfect
information for the behavior of inﬂation.
1.5 The government
The government ﬁnances government expenditure on the domestic ﬁnal good using lump
sum taxes. The stationary component of government expenditures is assumed to follow
an exogenous stochastic process, whose properties will be deﬁned later.
1.6 The equilibrium
We now turn to the description of the equilibrium of the economy.
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium of this economy is a sequence of prices {Pt}∞
t=0 = {Wt,zt,Pt,Rt,
Pt(i),i ∈ (0,1)}∞











t=0 = {Yt,Xt(i),Kt(i),ht(i);i ∈ (0,1)}∞
t=0
such that:
(i) given a sequence of prices {Pt}∞
t=0 and a sequence of shocks, {QH
t }∞
t=0 is a solution
to the representative household’s problem;
(ii) given a sequence of prices {Pt}∞
t=0 and a sequence of shocks, {QF
t }∞
t=0 is a solution
to the representative ﬁrms’ problem;
(iii) given a sequence of quantities {Qt}∞
t=0 and a sequence of shocks, {Pt}∞
t=0 clears the
markets









Gt = Tt (15)
and the money market.
(iv) Prices satisfy (10) and (11).
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The model is parameterized on US quarterly data for the period 1960:1–1999:4. The
data are taken from the Federal Reserve Database.6 The parameters are reported in
table 1.
β, the discount factor is set such that households discount the future at a 4% annual



























where ζ capture the preference for money holdings of the household. σ, the coeﬃcient
ruling risk aversion, is set equal to 1.5. ν is set such that the model generates a total
fraction of time devoted to market activities of 31%. η is borrowed from Chari et al.
(2000), who estimated it on postwar US data (-1.56). The value of ζ, 0.0649, is selected
such that the model mimics the average ratio of M1 money to nominal consumption
expenditures.
γ, the probability of price resetting is set in the benchmark case at 0.25, implying that
the average length of price contracts is about 4 quarters. The nominal growth of the
economy, µ, is set such that the average quarterly rate of inﬂation over the period is
π = 1.2% per quarter. The quarterly depreciation rate, δ, was set equal to 0.025. θ in
the benchmark case is set such that the level of markup in the steady state is 15%. α,
the elasticity of the production function to physical capital, is set such that the model
reproduces the US labor share — deﬁned as the ratio of labor compensation over GDP
— over the sample period (0.575).
The evolution of technology is assumed to contain two components. One capturing de-
terministic growth and the other stochastic growth. The stochastic one, at = log(At/A)
is assumed to follow a stationary AR(1) process of the form
at = ρaat−1 + εa,t
with |ρa| < 1 and εa,t   N(0,σ2
a). We set ρa = 0.95 and7 σa = 0.008.
Alternative descriptions of the productivity process may be equally plausible. For in-
stance, productivity growth may have followed a deterministic trend that permanently
6URL: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred/
7There is a non–negligible change in the volatility of the Solow residual between the pre and the post
Volcker period. That up to 1979:4 is 0.0084 while that after 1980:1 is 0.0062. For the evaluation of the
model it is the former period that is relevant. Note that for the government spending shock the diﬀerence
between the two periods is negligible.
15
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Preferences
Discount factor β 0.988
Relative risk aversion σ 1.500
Parameter of CES in utility function η -1.560
Weight of money in the utility function ζ 0.065
CES weight in utility function ν 0.344
Technology
Capital elasticity of intermediate output α 0.281
Capital adjustment costs parameter ϕ 1.000
Depreciation rate δ 0.025
Parameter of markup θ 0.850
Probability of price resetting γ 0.250
Shocks and policy parameters
Persistence of technology shock ρa 0.950
Standard deviation of technology shock σa 0.008
Persistence of government spending shock ρg 0.970
Volatility of government spending shock σg 0.020
Goverment share g/y 0.200
Nominal growth µ 1.012
shifted downward in the late 60s to early 70s.8 In our model, this would mean that the
FED learns about the trend in productivity rather than about the current level of the
— temporary — shock to productivity. We are unsure about how our results would be
aﬀected by using an alternative process, but, given the state of the art in this area, we
do not think that it is possible to identify the productivity process with any degree of
conﬁdence.
The government spending shock9 is assumed to follow an AR(1) process
log(gt) = ρg log(gt−1) + (1 − ρg)log(g) + εg,t
with |ρg| < 1 and εg,t ∼ N(0,σ2
g). The persistence parameter is set to, ρg, of 0.97 and
the standard deviation of innovations is σg = 0.02. The government spending to output
ratio is set to 0.20.
An important feature of our analysis is that the policymakers (and also the public, since
we assume symmetric information) have imperfect knowledge about the true state of the
8For instance, this is the assumption made by Bullard and Eusepi, 2003.
9The –logarithm of the– government expenditure series is ﬁrst detrended using a linear trend.
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t denotes true potential output and ξt is a noisy process that satisﬁes:
i) E(ξt) = 0 for all t;





ξ if t = k
0 Otherwise
In order to facilitate the interpretation of σξ we set its value in relation to the volatility
of the technology shock. More precisely, we deﬁne ς as ς = σξ/σa. Diﬀerent values were
assigned to ς in order to gauge the eﬀects of imperfect information in the model.
3 The results
The model is ﬁrst log–linearized around the deterministic steady state and then solved
according to the method outlined in the appendix.
We start by assuming the standard speciﬁcation for the HMT rule, namely, ρ = 0.75,
kπ = 1.5 and ky = 0.5 (Hereafter we denote Θ = {ρr,kπ,ky}) and vary the degree of
uncertainty — the quality of the signal — about potential output.11 The objective of
this exercise is to determine i) whether a policy reaction function of the type commonly
attributed to the FED during the 80s and 90s is consistent with high and persistent
inﬂation of the type observed in the 70s; and ii) the role played by imperfect information.
This exercise may then prove useful for determining whether the great inﬂation can be
attributed mostly to bad luck and incomplete information (as Orphanides, 2001, 2003
has argued) or insuﬃciently aggressive reaction to inﬂation developments — a low kπ,
as emphasized by Clarida, Gerler and Gali, 2000. Or to an inherent inﬂation bias, as
emphasized by Ireland, 1999.
We report two sets of statistics. The volatility of H-P ﬁltered actual output, annualized
inﬂation and investment. And the impulse response functions (IRF) of actual output and
10Making some variable other than actual output noisy does not materially aﬀect the results. As a
matter of fact, assuming that inﬂation rather than actual output is imperfectly observed further enhances
the ability of the model to match the data.
11To be more precise, we vary the size of ς.
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Info.), the imperfect information model with ς = 1 (Imp. Info. (I)) and ς = 8 (Imp. Info.
(II)). The IRF for the inﬂation rate is annualized and expressed in percentage points.
The actual rate of inﬂation following a shock is simply found by adding the response
reported in the IRF to the steady state value (π=4.8%).
There exists considerable uncertainty about the (type and) size of the shock that trig-
gered the productivity slowdown of the 70s. We do not take a position on this. We
proceed by selecting a value for the supply shock that can generate a large and persis-
tent increase in the inﬂation rate under at least one of the informational assumptions
considered. By large, we mean an increase in the inﬂation rate of the order of 5–7 per-
centage points, implying that the maximum rate of inﬂation obtained during that period
is about 10%-12%. We then feed a series of shocks that include this value for the ﬁrst
quarter of 1973 into our model and generate the other statistics described above.
Figure 1 reports the IRFs in the case of a standard HMT rule. The model can produce
a large and persistent increase in the inﬂation rate if two conditions are met: The shock
is very large (of the order of 33%) and the degree of imperfect information is very high
(say, ς = 8). Moreover, table 3 indicates that the model can generate a realistic degree
of macroeconomic volatility in the case of a high degree of imperfect information. For
instance, the volatility of output, investment and inﬂation in the case γ = 0.25 (4 quarters
contracts) and ς = 8 (Imp. Info (II)) are 1.820%, 6.736% and 0.619% respectively, to
be compared to 1.639%, 7.271% and 0.778% in the data. The model fails, though, in
its prediction of the maximal eﬀect on output following such a shock. In particular,
the maximal predicted eﬀect is -19.812% which seems implausibly high (table 2). On
the other hand, the performance of the model under perfect information is bad. The
increase in inﬂation is quite small, output and investment volatility is too large and
inﬂation volatility too low and the maximal eﬀects are even higher.
Imperfect information is critical for the ability of the model to generate a persistent
increase in inﬂation as well as suﬃcient volatility following a persistent supply shock.
When the variance of the noise is large, much of the change in actual inﬂation is at-
tributed to cyclical rather than ”core” developments. This means that estimated future
inﬂation —and hence the inﬂation ”gap”— is sticky, i.e., it does not move much with
the current shocks and actual inﬂation (see Figure 2). Imperfect information introduces
a serially correlated error term in the Phillips curve, whose size and persistence depends
on the size of κπ and the speed of learning. As a result, the policy reaction to a per-
ceived small inﬂation gap proves too weak even if κπ is large, resulting in countercyclical
policy. The real interest rate is decreased signiﬁcantly, see Figure 3, fuelling inﬂation
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will be the case for a persistent shock and slow learning) the increase in actual inﬂation
will be persistent too. This requirement does not seem to pose a problem for the model
as the magnitude of the predicted gap between actual and expected inﬂation seems to
be in line with that observed in the 70s.
The choice of the inﬂation variable that enters the policy rule plays an important role.
The argument above has suggested that the source of the persistence in inﬂation is the
stickiness of expected inﬂation. Were the FED to react to current or past actual inﬂation
relative to target then inﬂation would be contained more quickly. In this case, however,
the model would behave less satisfactorily. Inﬂation volatility would be further away
from that in the data, output volatility would be exaggerated and the maximal eﬀect on
output would be even higher. Thus, excessive policymaker optimism about the future
inﬂation path plays an important role.
The strength of the stabilization motive (the coeﬃcient ky) does not play an important
role in the analysis. We have repeated the analysis under ky=1.2 and ky=1.7 with
almost identical results (Figure 4 and Table 4). This is a comforting ﬁnding because it
is diﬃcult to justify diﬀerences in stabilization motives between the pre and post 1980
policymakers. Diﬀerences in luck and information are much less controversial.
The model does not perform as well with a lower kπ (lower panels of Figure 4 and Table
4). In this case it is diﬃcult to both match volatility and generate the appropriate
inﬂation dynamics. If the model matches volatility well then it exaggerates the increase
in inﬂation.
Increasing the degree of degree of price ﬂexibility (say, from γ = 0.25 to γ = 1/3 does not
alter the basic picture but improves things somewhat. A smaller shock is now required,
inﬂation volatility moves closer to that in the data and the maximal eﬀect on output is
reduced. At the same time, inﬂation persistence is somewhat reduced.
We have run a larger number of experiments involving this HMT rule and alternative
values of the other parameters of the model without changing overall model performance.
To summarize our main results: The NK model under the standard HMT policy rule
and imperfect information can generate plausible inﬂation dynamics and good overall
ﬁt in the face of a very substantial productivity slowdown and expected inﬂation gap
targeting. Nonetheless, this speciﬁcation has some weaknesses, found in the requirement
of a very large shock, and of a very severe predicted recession.
We now turn to speciﬁcations in which policy is conducted in a way that destabilizes
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have investigated the properties of the model under the policy rule parametrization
suggested by CGG, namely, ρr = 0.75,κπ = 0.80,κy = 0.40. Such a rule leads to real
indeterminacy. This speciﬁcation can generate a large, persistent increase in inﬂation
(see Figure 5), but the associated response of output is implausible and macroeconomic
volatility is too low (Tables 5 and 6). An important feature of this speciﬁcation is that
real indeterminacy introduces an additional source of uncertainty related to a sunspot
shock that aﬀects beliefs. We assume that the sunspot shock is purely extrinsic and is
therefore not correlated with any fundamental shock. Since we have no information that
would allow us to calibrate this shock we have explored several cases. In the ﬁrst one, the
volatility of the sunspot shock is set to 0. In this case, the model overestimates output
volatility, but signiﬁcantly underestimates that of both investment, consumption and
inﬂation. This is also the case when the volatility is set at the same level as that of the
technology shock. When the sunspot shock is calibrated in order for the model to match
inﬂation volatility, the implied standard deviation of output is widely overestimated (by
almost 40%). The same obtains when the sunspot is calibrated to match investment
volatility, and this is highly magniﬁed when the sunspot is used to mimic the volatility
of the nominal interest rate.12 Nonetheless, we have encountered more successful policy
speciﬁcations within the range of indeterminate equilibria. Figure 6 and Tables 7 and
8 correspond to such a case with ρr = 0.75,κπ = 1.20,κy = 0.80 As can be seen,
this speciﬁcation performs fairly well. The model has little diﬃculty producing high
and persistent inﬂation and can account for volatility fairly well (but it underestimates
investment volatility). If it has an Achilles heel, it is to be found in its excessive reaction
of output (Figure 6), a weakness that it shares with the imperfect information version
under the standard HMT rule. Hence, the main advantage of this speciﬁcation may be
that it works even with a much smaller shock.
How can we explain the similarity in the results under the two speciﬁcations of the policy
rule? Recall that the policy rule takes the form
b Rt = ρb Rt−1 + (1 − ρ)[kπEt(b πt+1 − π) + ky(b yt − y?
t)]
Under imperfect information, Et(b πt+1 − π) is small while b yt − y?
t is large (following a
supply shock). Under perfect information, the opposite pattern obtains. For comparable
ky and given that kπ > ky there exist kπ with the property that kpi is larger under
imperfect information that lead to comparable changes in the nominal interest rate.
12We could not set the sunspot volatility so as to match consumption volatility as it is already over-
estimated when the standard deviation of the sunspot is set to 0.
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equilibrium than imperfect information on the part of the policymakers (because of
the direct targeting of potential output in the policy rule), then a similar interest rate
reaction will result in similar behavior of the other variables independent of the degree
of imperfect information. This reasoning indicates that there may be a serious diﬃculty
in identifying the policy rule. The diﬀerence in the results of CGG and Orphanides who
rely on diﬀerent information assumptions (actual vs real time data) may perhaps be
explained by this argument.
Before concluding, let us point out that there is a widespread belief that the great
inﬂation did not actually start in the early 70s but rather in the mid–60s. In our model
a series of unperceived negative supply shocks, culminating with an oil shock in 1973
—that was misperceived as temporary— can reproduce the upward trend as well as the
spike in the inﬂation series13.
4 Conclusions
Inﬂation in the US reached high levels during the 1970s, due to a large extent to what
proved to be excessively loose monetary policy. There exist several views concerning
the conduct of policy at that time. One views it as an unavoidable mistake on the
part of a monetary authority whose tolerance of inﬂation did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly
from that commonly attributed to the authorities in the 80s and 90s. According to this
view (Orphanides, 2001), the large decrease in actual output following the persistent
downward shift in potential output was interpreted as a decrease in the output gap.
It led to expansionary monetary policy that exaggerated the inﬂationary impact of the
decrease in potential output. Eventually and after a long delay, the FED realized that
potential output growth was lower and adjusted policy to bring inﬂation down. Imperfect
information rather than tolerance of inﬂation played the critical role in the inﬂation
process.
Another leading view is that the FED’s reaction rule exhibited a weak response towards
inﬂation (relative to the Volcker–Greenspan (V–G) era) and perhaps more policy activism
(Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 2001). The implication of this view is that adoption of
the standard (under V–G) Henderson–McKibbin–Taylor rule would have prevented the
persistent surge in inﬂation.
Our ﬁndings suggest that both views present empirically plausible scenarios. The infor-
13There is considerable evidence, based, for instance, on the behavior of the current account, that the
increase in the oil price in 1973 was perceived as temporary.
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April 2004mation available in the data does not suﬃce to discriminate between them in a clear,
conclusive fashion. There is a need for additional races. Nevertheless, we suspect that
it may prove very diﬃcult to distinguish between these alternative explanations for rea-
sons oﬀered above. In a recent paper, Lubic and Schforheide, 2003, argue that the data
support a policy speciﬁcation with indeterminacy over one with determinacy (for the
70s). Unfortunately, while their model allows for policy regime shifts in policy it does
not include the learning aspects that are at the heart of the Orphanides position. We
are currently investigating this issue using the Lubic and Schforheide methodology but
also incorporating learning on the part of the policymakers. Whether this approach will
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The solution of the model under imperfect information with a Kalman
ﬁlter

































































Y is a vector of ny control variables, S is a vector of ns signals used by the agents to
form expectations, Xb is a vector of nb predetermined (backward looking) state variables
(including shocks to fundamentals), Xf is a vector of nf forward looking state variables,
ﬁnally u and v are two Gaussian white noise processes with variance–covariance matrices
Σuu and Σvv respectively and E(uv0) = 0. Xt+i|t = E(Xt+i|It) for i > 0 and where It
denotes the information set available to the agents at the beginning of period t.


















where B0 = M−1
cc Mcs and B1 = M−1










with B = B0 + B1.
5.1 Solving the system

















= Msc0Yt+1|t + Msc1Yt|t (21)
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W = −(Mss0 − Msc0B)
−1 (Mss1 + Mse1 − Msc1B)
Using the Jordan form associated with (22) and applying standard methods for elimi-





From which it follows that
Xb





t+1|t = (Wfb + WffG)Xb
t|t = WfXb
t|t (24)




































































































































































where, Wc = −M−1
ss0(Mss1 −Msc1B0). Hence, considering the second block of the above



















with F0 = −Wc
ff
−1Wc
fb and F1 = G − F0.

















with M0 = Wc
bb + Wc


















where S0 = C0
b + C0




















where Π0 = B0
b + B0





Since our solution involves terms in Xb
t|t, we need to compute this quantity. However, the
only information we can exploit is a signal St that we described previously. We therefore
use a Kalman ﬁlter approach to compute the optimal prediction of Xb
t|t.
In order to recover the Kalman ﬁlter, it is a good idea to think in terms of expectational






b St = St − St|t−1
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t|t, only the signal relying on e St = St − S1Xb
t|t can be
used to infer anything on Xb
t|t. Therefore, the policy maker revises its expectations using
a linear rule depending on e Se
t = St − S1Xb
t|t. The ﬁltering equation then writes
Xb
t|t = Xb
t|t−1 + K(e Se
t − e Se
t|t−1) = Xb
t|t−1 + K(S0 b Xb
t + vt)
where K is the ﬁlter gain matrix, that we would like to compute.
The ﬁrst thing we have to do is to rewrite the system in terms of state–space represen-
tation. Since St|t−1 = (S0 + S1)Xb
t|t−1, we have





= S0 b Xb
t + S1K(S0 b Xb
t + vt) + vt
= S? b Xb
t + νt
where S? = (I + S1K)S0 and νt = (I + S1K)vt.














= M0 b Xb
t − M0K(S0 b Xb
t + vt) + M2ut+1
= M? b Xb
t + ωt+1
where M? = M0(I − KS0) and ωt+1 = M2ut+1 − M0Kvt.
We therefore end–up with the following state–space representation
b Xb
t+1 = M? b Xb
t + ωt+1 (27)
b St = S? b Xb
t + νt (28)
For which the Kalman ﬁlter is given by
b Xb
t|t = b Xb
t|t−1 + PS?0(S?PS?0 + Σνν)−1(S? b Xb
t + νt)
But since b Xb
t|t is an expectation error, it is not correlated with the information set in
t − 1, such that b Xb
t|t−1 = 0. The prediction formula for b Xb
t|t therefore reduces to
b Xb
t|t = PS?0(S?PS?0 + Σνν)−1(S? b Xb
t + νt) (29)
where P solves
P = M?PM?0 + Σωω
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Note however that the above solution is obtained for a given K matrix that remains to
be computed. We can do that by using the basic equation of the Kalman ﬁlter:
Xb
t|t = Xb
t|t−1 + K(e Se
t − e Se
t|t−1)
= Xb
t|t−1 + K(St − S1Xb
t|t − (St|t−1 − S1Xb
t|t−1))
= Xb






t|t = (I + KS1)−1(Xb
t|t−1 + K(St − S0Xb
t|t−1))
= (I + KS1)−1(Xb
t|t−1 + KS1Xb
t|t−1 − KS1Xb
t|t−1 + K(St − S0Xb
t|t−1))
= (I + KS1)−1(I + KS1)Xb
t|t−1 + (I + KS1)−1K(St − (S0 + S1)Xb
t|t−1))
= Xb
t|t−1 + (I + KS1)−1K b St
= Xb
t|t−1 + K(I + S1K)−1b St
= Xb
t|t−1 + K(I + S1K)−1(S? b Xb
t + νt)
where we made use of the identity (I + KS1)−1K ≡ K(I + S1K)−1. Hence, identifying
to (29), we have
K(I + S1K)−1 = PS?0(S?PS?0 + Σνν)−1









+ Σvv)(I + S1K)0
i−1
K(I + S1K)−1 = PS00
(I + S1K)0(I + S1K)0−1(S0PS00






P = M?PM?0 + Σωω
Remembering that M? = M0(I + KS0) and Σωω = M0KΣvvK0M00 + M2ΣuuM20, we
have
P = M0(I − KS0)P
￿
M0(I − KS0)
￿0 + M0KΣvvK0M00 + M2ΣuuM20
= M0
h
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P = M0
h
P − PS00(S0PS00 + Σvv)−1S0P
i
M00 + M2ΣuuM20 (31)
5.3 Summary
























t|t−1) + vt) (36)
Xb
t+1|t = (M0 + M1)Xb
t|t (37)
which describe the dynamics of our economy.
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Figure 1: IRF to a negative technology shock
Θ = {ρ,kπ,ky} = {0.75,1.50,0.50}, -33% shock






















































Table 2: Impact and extreme eﬀect of a technology shock
Perf. Info Imp. Info (I) Imp. Info (II)
Impact Max Impact Max Impact Max
Θ = {0.75,1.50,0.50}, -33% Shock
Output -45.074 -45.074 -29.977 -38.695 -3.163 -20.803
Inﬂation 0.335 1.543 2.597 2.597 6.569 6.569
Note: Perfect information, Imperfect information (I) and Imperfect information
(II) correspond to ς=0,1,8 respectively, where ς is the amount of noise.
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σy σi σπ
Data 1.639 7.271 0.778
Perf. Info. 4.349 15.625 0.097
Imp. Info. (I) 3.891 14.324 0.212
Imp. Info. (II) 1.820 6.736 0.619
Note: The standard deviations are computed for HP–ﬁltered series. y, i
and π are output, investment and inﬂation respectively. Perfect informa-
tion, Imperfect information I and Imperfect information II correspond to
ς=0,1,8 respectively where ς is the amount of noise. Θ = {ρ,kπ,ky}
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Figure 3: Ex–ante versus Ex–post real interest rate Θ = {0.75,1.50,0.50}
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Table 4: Standard Deviations
σy σi σπ
Data 1.639 7.271 0.778
(ρ,κπ,κy)=(0.75,1.50,0.20)
Perf. Info. 3.509 12.774 0.108
Imp. Info. (I) 3.146 11.549 0.154
Imp. Info. (II) 1.598 5.865 0.483
(ρ,κπ,κy)=(0.75,1.50,0.70)
Perf. Info. 3.255 11.612 0.093
Imp. Info. (I) 2.957 10.821 0.188
Imp. Info. (II) 1.509 5.521 0.478
(ρ,κπ,κy)=(0.75,1.20,0.50)
Perf. Info. 3.103 10.810 0.278
Imp. Info. (I) 2.856 10.251 0.313
Imp. Info. (II) 1.468 5.269 0.492
Note: The standard deviations are computed for HP–ﬁltered series. y, i
and π are output, investment and inﬂation respectively. Θ = {ρ,kπ,ky}
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Figure 4: IRF to a negative -33% technology shock
Panel A: Θ = {0.75,1.50,0.20}























































Panel B: Θ = {0.75,1.50,0.70}






















































Panel C: Θ = {0.75,1.2,0.5}
























































Working Paper Series No. 336
April 20048 Real Indeterminacy: The Clarida–Gali–Gertler rule
Figure 5: IRF to a -12% technology shock Θ = {0.75,0.80,0.40}






















































Table 6: Standard Deviations, Θ = {0.75,0.80,0.40}
σs σy σi σπ
Data 1.639 7.271 0.778
q=0.25, -12% shock
0 1.702 5.545 0.529
σa 1.727 5.689 0.542
0.0400(a) 2.272 8.463 0.777
0.0294(b) 2.030 7.278 0.676
0.1294(c) 5.065 21.029 1.861
Note: The standard deviations are computed for HP–ﬁltered series. y, i
and π are output, investment and inﬂation respectively. (a), (b) and (c)
match σπ, σi and σR. Θ = {ρ,kπ,ky}
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Figure 6: IRF to a -8% technology shock, Θ = {0.75,1.20,0.80}
























































Table 8: Standard Deviations, Θ = {0.75,1.20,0.80}
σs σy σi σπ
Data 1.639 7.271 0.778
0 1.625 5.274 0.689
σa 1.650 5.394 0.714
0.006(a) 1.639 5.340 0.704
0.035(b) 2.072 7.271 1.042
0.016(c) 1.724 5.736 0.778
0.058(d) 2.681 9.827 1.461
Note: The standard deviations are computed for HP–ﬁltered series. y, i
and π are output, investment and inﬂation respectively. (a), (b), (c) and
(d) match σy, σi, σπ and σR. Θ = {ρ,kπ,ky}
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